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The Operations Evaluation Department
(OED) of the World Bank has recently
completed a meta-evaluation of the CGIAR
as part of an overall evaluation of the
Bank’s involvement in 70 global programs.
At $50 million a year of completely unre-
stricted funds, the CGIAR currently
receives 40 percent of the Development
Grant Facility (DGF) grants going to global
programs. Increasing competition for such
grants to meet a variety of global challenges
and the need for selectivity were among the
factors leading OED to review the Bank’s
involvement in global programs.
Findings
OED concludes that the CGIAR has been a
unique instrument of international cooper-
ation. Its productivity-enhancing research
has had sizeable impacts on reducing
poverty by increasing employment, raising
incomes, lowering food prices, and releas-
ing land from cropping—a phenomenon
that has come to be known as the Green
Revolution. Moreover, further improve-
ments in sustainable agricultural productiv-
ity are critical to meet the international
community’s Millennium Development
Goal of halving poverty by 2015.
The CGIAR at 31: 
Celebrating Its 
Achievements, 
Facing Its Challenges
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research(CGIAR) was established in 1971 to scale up years of effortby the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations in supporting four
international agricultural research centers, in Colombia, Mexico,
Nigeria, and the Philippines. As the first global program to receive
grants from the World Bank’s net income, the CGIAR’s original mis-
sion was a strategic, science-based focus on increasing “the pile of
rice on the plates of food-short consumers,” as characterized by for-
mer Chairman David Hopper. It was to use the best science in
advanced countries to develop technologies for the benefit of food-
deficit countries and populations. Today it supports 16 international
Centers, and from an initial 18, its membership has expanded to 62,
including 24 developing and transition economies (box 1).
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But the CGIAR is facing huge challenges, and it is less
focused on enhancing agricultural productivity than it used
to be. Its current mix of activities reflects neither its com-
parative advantage nor its core competence. The CGIAR’s
expenditures on productivity-enhancing agricultural
research —which is a global or regional public good ideally
suited to a publicly funded global network such as the
CGIAR—declined by 6.5 percent annually in real terms
between 1992 and 2001, while expenditures on improving
policies and on protecting the environment increased by 3.1
percent annually during the same time period (figure 1).
At the same time, overall CGIAR funding has stagnated
in nominal terms, declined in real terms, and become
increasingly restricted over the past decade. Overall contri-
butions grew at an average annual rate of 0.7 percent in
nominal terms and declined by 1.8 percent per year in real
terms between 1992 and 2001. The degree of restricted
funding (as defined by the CGIAR’s own reporting system)
increased from 36 percent of total funding in 1992 to 57
percent in 2001, with most of this increase in restricted
funding occurring since 1998 (figure 2).
A Changing Context
Several factors explain the changing research mix and the
increasing restrictions. First, germplasm improvement
research has been unpopular in the constituencies of some
key donors because of negative perceptions of the Green
Revolution. Second, the CGIAR has correctly responded to
the genuine second-generation environmental pressures on
soils and water created by the radical change in farming
systems during the Green Revolution. Third, the rise of
environmentalism, the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, and
growing environmental advocacy in donor countries has
pressured the CGIAR to respond to environmental con-
cerns. Fourth, the failure of many governments of develop-
ing countries and their donor supporters (including the
World Bank; see figure 3) to make the necessary invest-
ments in their national agricultural research systems
(NARS) has led CGIAR donors to turn to the Centers to fill
the national and local public goods gaps closer to the
Box 1. Portrait of a Global Program
The CGIAR is the oldest and still the largest of the global
programs supported by the Bank:
• The CGIAR supports 16 autonomous research Centers
and 8,500 scientists and staff in more than 100 countries.
• It has 62 members, comprising 24 developing and 22
industrialized countries, 12 international/regional organi-
zations, and 4 foundations.
• Co-sponsored by the World Bank, the Food and Agricul-
tural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the
United Nations Development Program, and (more
recently) the International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment, the System has a Secretariat housed in the Bank and
a Technical Advisory Committee (recently renamed the
interim Science Council) in FAO.
• The CGIAR has received upwards of $930 million of
unrestricted funds from the Bank since its inception in
1971, out of $5.6 billion in total support from the inter-
national community.
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Figure 1. Research with Proven Impacts on 
Poverty Has Declined Dramatically
Average annual change in Center’s expenditures by type of research activity
(adjusted for inflation), 1992–2001
Source: Calculations based on CGIAR Financial Reports, 1992–2001.
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Source: CGIAR Financial Reports, 1988–2001.
farmer, which should ideally be filled by national systems.
Collaterally, the maintenance and management of the
CGIAR gene banks of 600,000 accessions, a unique global
public good, has suffered from inadequate funding.
Two changes in the funding processes of the CGIAR
since the mid-1990s have also increased the influence of
individual donors (and their domestic constituencies) on
the research expenditures of the CGIAR. First, in response
to a funding crisis in 1993-94, the Bank changed the alloca-
tion of its own financial contribution from a “donor of last
resort” model to a matching grant model. Under the for-
mer, the Bank’s contribution was used to fill gaps between
the System’s research priorities as articulated by the Tech-
nical Advisory Committee (TAC) and the financial contri-
butions to those priorities by other donors. Under the
matching grant model, the Bank’s contribution indiscrimi-
nately matches funding from other donors, whether in sup-
port of System-wide priorities or not. Second, to create
incentives for Centers to mobilize additional funding and to
accommodate donors, the CGIAR expanded the definition
of its “agreed research agenda” to include both the former
“core” agenda (largely the high-return global and regional
public goods research) and the “non-core” agenda (donor-
funded, mostly downstream activities that TAC did not
consider as high a priority).
The cumulative result of these trends has been the
declining influence of independent scientific advice pro-
vided by the TAC, a concurrent transformation of the
CGIAR’s authorizing environment from being science-
driven to being donor-driven, and a shift in the System
from producing global and regional public goods toward
providing national and local services. Historically, the TAC
played a powerful role in the CGIAR by recommending
allocations of resources among Centers, programs, and
activities; monitoring budgets; and conducting Center-level
and System-level reviews. Today, donors’ preferences are
largely determining resource allocations independently of
TAC’s medium- and longer-term priority setting. The
CGIAR experience demonstrates that the sum of the inter-
ests of individual stakeholders in a global organization
need not define a global public good.
A System-Level Response is Needed
At the same time, the growing importance of genetic
resource management, the biotechnology revolution, intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs), and private sector research
are pressuring the overall System, and call for System-level
responses, strategies, and policies to deal with these System-
wide challenges. As a result, the Third System Review (TSR)
in 1998 recommended that the CGIAR adopt a corporate
model and establish a legal entity in order to deal with IPR
issues and public-private partnerships. For, unlike more
recent global programs, such as the Global Environment
Facility and the Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and Malaria,
the CGIAR System has no formal or legal persona, written
charter, or even a memorandum of understanding.
Although the CGIAR membership rejected this TSR rec-
ommendation in 1999, the CGIAR Committee of Board
Chairs and the Center Directors’ Committee jointly recom-
mended a decentralized Federation of Centers in 2000.
While the two proposals differed in the degree of decentral-
ization proposed, both acknowledged the need for a legal
entity with a centralized board to enable System-level
responses to IPR issues. But collective action problems cre-
ated by the diverse interests of the CGIAR’s constituents
have forestalled such fundamental organizational reforms
in the CGIAR. The six founding principles that were
adopted when the CGIAR consisted of fewer Centers and
less diverse constituents are no longer suited to today’s
politically driven authorizing environment, wider research
agenda, and expanding membership (box 2.)
Since 2000, under the leadership of Chairman Ian John-
son, the CGIAR has instituted four reforms in its gover-
nance and management known as the Change Design and
Management Process. These comprise establishing an Exec-
utive Council and a System Office, transforming the TAC
into a Science Council, and initiating a programmatic
approach to research in the form of Challenge Programs.
Some of these reforms are creditable, but others need
revisiting. The chairman gets high marks for establishing
the long-overdue Executive Council. But OED is skeptical
that the transformation of the TAC into a Science Council
will achieve the objective of strengthening the role of inde-
pendent scientific advice in the CGIAR, since the Science
Council will focus primarily on science quality and play a
small, if any, role in the important functions of priority set-
ting and resource allocation. 
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Source: OED data.
4 World Bank Operat ions  Evaluat ion Department
OED also finds that the Challenge Programs are pro-
ceeding without first addressing the issues of System-level
funding, priority setting, science quality, and governance
raised in previous evaluations of the CGIAR. OED recom-
mends that the CGIAR postpone the approval of new Chal-
lenge Programs (beyond the first two already approved)
pending the installation of the Science Council, an assess-
ment of System-level priorities, and a thorough review of
the design and approval process of the first two programs
to learn lessons for the selection, design, sequencing, and
phasing of future Challenge Programs in the context of Sys-
tem-level priorities and strategies.
The World Bank plays multiple roles in the CGIAR—as
convener and donor to the System, and as a lender to devel-
oping countries for complementary activities. As a result,
the Bank has been the guardian of the CGIAR and the glue
that makes the System coherent and larger than the sum of
its 16 research Centers. Other donors view the Bank’s lead-
ership role, its financial contributions, and its operational
support as a seal of approval, giving them the confidence to
continue to invest in the System. But conflicts of interest
among the roles of the Environmentally and Socially Sus-
tainable Development (ESSD) Vice President (who is also
the CGIAR chairman), the CGIAR director, and other ESSD
staff involved with the System, as well as inadequate Bank
oversight (from outside the vice presidency of the Bank’s
involvement in the CGIAR), have compromised the Bank’s
capacity to exercise strategic leadership of the CGIAR and
to press for reforms on the scale or at a speed that might be
warranted. In particular, it is problematic for the CGIAR
chairman to be both judge and advocate—to acknowledge
the need for and to press for major reforms, while also mak-
ing the case for continued funding to the Bank and donors.
Next Steps
Further reforms are needed. The governance of the CGIAR
should be reconfigured to promote greater efficiency,
tougher priority setting, and scientific excellence without
sacrificing legitimacy and ownership. The strategic priori-
ties of the CGIAR should respond more actively to changes
in the global research context, giving more prominence to
basic plant breeding and germplasm improvement, and
reshaping natural resource management research in the
areas of the CGIAR’s comparative advantage to focus
tightly on productivity enhancement and sustainable use of
natural resources for the benefit of developing countries. 
OED recommends:
• The Bank should lead a concerted effort at the highest
level, much as when the CGIAR was established, to
Box 2. The CGIAR’s Founding Principles Need Revisiting to Maintain Impact on Poverty Reduction
Donor sovereignty – Various interests in donor domestic constituencies have encouraged members to tie their contributions to specific
regions of the world, Centers, and programs, and to their own national personnel or institutions. While broadening the CGIAR’s
political support, this has created a chaotic marketplace for global public goods research and shifted the composition of the overall
program from strategic research to development and dissemination activities tied to short-term donor agendas in which the CGIAR
does not have a comparative advantage or core competencies.
Center autonomy – Having 16 research Centers as the only independent legal entities governed by self-nominating boards has
increased fragmentation, inter-Center rivalry, and board membership (to 220 members); diluted board accountability and responsibil-
ity for quality; and contributed to collective action problems.
Consensus decisionmaking – Expanding and diversifying membership has broadened ownership and provided seats at the table for the
private sector and NGOs. But this has made it difficult to reach the consensus among members on the governance, organization, man-
agement, and financing issues needed to achieve the CGIAR’s mission. Every member effectively has a veto, and the lack of consensus
has become an excuse for failing to reach resolution on important issues.
Independent technical advice – Undermining this desirable principle by increasing restricted funding has diminished the authority of
the independent technical advise of the TAC (now the interim Science Council) in priority setting and resource allocation. 
Informal status of the System – The lack of memoranda of understanding, constitution, legal status, or explicit bylaws at the System
level has constrained the ability of the CGIAR to speak with a single voice, and to develop System-wide policies and long-term strate-
gies. Even with the newly established ExCo, its informal status is ill-suited to rapid changes in science, to the increasing role of the pri-
vate sector and intellectual property, and for determining accountabilities and responsibilities.
Non-political (non-partisan, non-ideological) nature – The need to raise resources for a wider mission has revealed the different priori-
ties of the constituencies within each of the industrial and developing countries, and has undermined the CGIAR’s non-political
nature.
World Bank Management Response
Management concurred with most of the report’s recommendations, while noting that many of these reflected actions already taken
or planned by the CGIAR. Management agreed that restricted funding by some donors allocated to projects preferred by those donors
has diverted some activities of the CGIAR Centers from their core research programs. However, Management saw the report’s claim
that “the CGIAR is less focused” as potentially too sweeping. The CGIAR broadened its strategic focus to include natural resource
management 12 to 15 years ago at the urging of several external panels of experts and with the full support of investors and clients
alike. Nonetheless, Management does see a need to continue to focus on productivity research and to be alert to the risk that increas-
ing the focus on natural resources may dilute the Centers’ contribution to global public goods if they become more heavily involved in
local development activities. 
Management disagreed that conflicts of interest among the Bank’s roles and inadequate Bank oversight have compromised the
Bank’s strategic leadership of the CGIAR. However, Management agreed to establish a clearer distinction between the Bank’s over-
sight and management functions. Management agreed that further reforms of the CGIAR may be necessary, but not to slow down or
significantly shift the direction of the current reform effort. While recognizing that the CGIAR members have previously rejected the
idea of a single legal entity, Management agreed to press key donors and other members to again give serious consideration to the cre-
ation of a legal entity covering the CGIAR’s central oversight and fund allocation functions. 
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achieve fundamental reforms in the organizational struc-
ture, finance, and management of the CGIAR—particu-
larly to encourage donors to reverse the trend in
restricted funding and to establish clear targets for an
increased share of unrestricted funding.
• The Bank should address its corporate governance
responsibilities in the management of the CGIAR, sepa-
rate oversight and management functions within the
Bank to address the conflicts of interests that exist
among the Bank’s roles in the CGIAR, and exercise
oversight consistent with the major roles that its plays in
the CGIAR.
• The Bank should abandon the current matching grant
model and ensure that its financial resources are allo-
cated strategically in support of global and regional pub-
lic goods that contribute to agricultural productivity and
poverty reduction, based on long-term priorities as artic-
ulated by the Science Council.
• The CGIAR should ensure that a strong, qualified, and
independent Science Council is established and vested
with the role and resources to establish System-wide pri-
orities, policies, and strategies, and to monitor and
report to the membership on the uses and allocations of
CGIAR resources toward fulfilling these System-wide
measures.
• The CGIAR should adopt a written charter that delin-
eates the roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities of
the officers and bodies that govern the System, as well as
a mechanism to reform the System’s cumbersome gover-
nance. It should also analyze the advantages and disad-
vantages of establishing all or part of the CGIAR as a
separate legal entity attuned to deal with today’s realities
for partnerships.
If these reforms are achieved, there is a strong argument
for increased funding for the CGIAR, including exploring
the use of grant funds for the provision of regional public
goods, and eventually global public goods, that reduce
poverty. As a lender to developing countries, the Bank also
needs to increase lending to agricultural research, educa-
tion, extension, and training, especially in Sub-Saharan
Africa, in order to enhance the performance of NARS.
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World Bank Executive Directors’ Perspective
The Committee praised the CGIAR’s achievements in providing global and regional public goods and increasing agricultural produc-
tivity in developing countries. However, it also concurred that the CGIAR is facing many new challenges and generally endorsed
OED’s recommendations for reform of the System in several areas:
• The Bank should lead an international effort to reform the CGIAR and to encourage donors to provide less restricted funding for
the System. However, the Committee made a distinction between “restricted funding” as defined by the CGIAR and certain donor
“requirements” (such as a priority on Africa) that may be consistent with development needs.
• The Bank should separate oversight and management functions within the Bank in order to avoid any perception of conflict of
interest. The Committee welcomed the announcement that the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist would be responsible for
the oversight function. 
• The CGIAR should establish a strong and independent Science Council, vested with the role and resources to establish System-wide
priorities and strategies.
• The CGIAR should slow down the approval of new Challenge Programs to first see the initial results of the ongoing pilots and to
allow the Science Council to get established.
• The CGIAR should increase its focus on agricultural productivity and on the provision of global and regional public goods.
• The CGIAR should adopt a written charter, and further analyze and debate the pros and cons of establishing the CGIAR as an
independent legal entity. Many of the challenges facing the CGIAR (including IPRs and public-private partnerships) require 
System-level responses and make a completely decentralized System unworkable. 
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